Niels Bohr as Philosopher of Experiment: Does Decoherence Theory
  Challenge Bohr's Doctrine of Classical Concepts? by Camilleri, Kristian & Schlosshauer, Maximilian
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
06
54
7v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.h
ist
-p
h]
  2
3 F
eb
 20
15
Niels Bohr as Philosopher of Experiment: Does Decoherence Theory Challenge
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Niels Bohr’s doctrine of the primacy of “classical concepts” is arguably his most criticized and
misunderstood view. We present a new, careful historical analysis that makes clear that Bohr’s
doctrine was primarily an epistemological thesis, derived from his understanding of the functional
role of experiment. A hitherto largely overlooked disagreement between Bohr and Heisenberg about
the movability of the “cut” between measuring apparatus and observed quantum system supports
the view that, for Bohr, such a cut did not originate in dynamical (ontological) considerations,
but rather in functional (epistemological) considerations. As such, both the motivation and the
target of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts are of a fundamentally different nature than what is
understood as the dynamical problem of the quantum-to-classical transition. Our analysis suggests
that, contrary to claims often found in the literature, Bohr’s doctrine is not, and cannot be, at
odds with proposed solutions to the dynamical problem of the quantum-classical transition that
were pursued by several of Bohr’s followers and culminated in the development of decoherence theory.
Journal reference: Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 49, 73–83 (2015)
I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of the attention Bohr’s writings have received
over the last three decades, scholarly opinion on how
we should understand his philosophy remains divided
(Brock 2003, Favrholdt 1992, Faye 1991, Faye and Folse
1994, Folse 1985, Honner 1987, Katsumori 2011, Mur-
doch 1987, Plotnitsky 1994, 2006). Much confusion still
reigns over how we should understand Bohr’s repeated
insistence that we must use classical concepts. This sit-
uation is all the more lamentable, given that, as Don
Howard has rightly noted, “the doctrine of classical con-
cepts turns out to be more fundamental to Bohr’s phi-
losophy of physics than are better-known doctrines, like
complementarity” (Howard 1994, p. 202). Scholars have
long pondered over precisely why Bohr felt that classi-
cal concepts should play such a primary role in quantum
physics. In perhaps his most frequently quoted account
of the doctrine, in his contribution to the 1949 Einstein
Festschrift, Bohr declared:
It is decisive to recognize that, however far
the phenomena transcend the scope of clas-
sical physical explanation, the account of all
evidence must be expressed in classical terms.
The argument is simply that by the word “ex-
periment” we refer to a situation where we
can tell others what we have done and what
we have learned and that, therefore, the ac-
count of the experimental arrangement and
of the results of the observations must be ex-
pressed in unambiguous language with suit-
able application of the terminology of classi-
cal physics (Bohr 1949, p. 209).
One can find this view, or at least anticipations of it,
in Bohr’s writings during the 1920s, but by the 1930s it
came to occupy a central place in Bohr’s epistemologi-
cal reflections on quantum mechanics. Indeed Bohr was
remarkably categorical about this point. As he was to
put it in a lecture in the early 1930s: “The unambiguous
interpretation of any measurement must be essentially
framed in terms of classical physical theories, and we
may say that in the sense the language of Newton and
Maxwell will remain the language of physics for all time”
(Bohr 1931, p. 692, emphasis added).
Over time a number of criticisms have been raised
against these views of Bohr’s. Most recently, spurred
by the insights brought about the decoherence program
(Bacciagaluppi 2012, Joos et al. 2003, Schlosshauer 2004,
2007, Zeh 1970, Zurek 1981, 1982, 2003), a number of
physicists have suggested that Bohr’s musings about the
primacy of classical concepts, and by extension his doc-
trine of an (ostensibly) fundamental quantum–classical
divide, amount to little more than superfluous semantic
or philosophical baggage, much of which has been dis-
credited by recent developments. Dieter Zeh, for exam-
ple, has contrasted the dynamical approach of decoher-
ence with the “irrationalism” of the Copenhagen school
(Joos et al. 2003, p. 27). Erich Joos, who attributes the
origins of decoherence to a dissatisfaction with the “or-
thodoxy of the Copenhagen school” and “the desire to
achieve a better understanding of the quantum–classical
relation” (Joos 2006, p. 54), has argued that “the mes-
sage of decoherence” is that “we do not need to take clas-
sical notions as the starting point for physics,” given that
“these emerge through the dynamical process of decoher-
ence from the quantum substrate” (Joos 2006, p. 77).
In this paper, we will take such claims and characteri-
zations as our motivation for pursuing a careful historical
2and philosophical investigation of Bohr’s views regarding
his doctrine of classical concepts and the problem of the
quantum–classical relationship. We will also analyze how
these views relate to what we will call the “dynamical”
approaches to the problem of the quantum-to-classical
transition, approaches that include the theory of decoher-
ence. As we shall see, decoherence is only the last step in
a long line of attempts to undergird (or supplant) Bohr’s
doctrines by an explicit dynamical and physical account.
Such approaches were already pursued by a number of
Bohr’s followers—notably Weizsa¨cker and Rosenfeld—in
the 1960s, who, far from seeing it as an invalidation of
Bohr’s basic insight, regarded it as providing a justifica-
tion of his views.
In this paper, we raise and address two central ques-
tions. The first question is why, and in what sense, Bohr
believed that classical concepts were indispensable in the
description of experiments. Given the large degree of
scholarly dispute and confusion about the exact meaning
of Bohr’s writings and his views, this requires that we
pay careful attention to Bohr’s texts. Here we echo Don
Howard’s call “to return to Bohr’s own words, filtered
through no preconceived dogmas” (Howard 1994, p. 201).
In particular, we need to disentangle Bohr’s views from
those of his contemporaries who professed to speak on his
behalf. Much of the confusion over Bohr’s philosophy has
resulted from a mistaken tendency to assume that Bohr’s
views formed the central plank in a unified and widely
shared viewpoint commonly known as the “Copenhagen
interpretation.” Yet extensive historical scholarship over
the past thirty years has challenged, if not seriously un-
dermined, the notion that any such consensus among the
founders of quantum mechanics ever existed.1
Further complicating matters is the notoriously vague
and imprecise use of the term “classical” in much of
the literature. This term is frequently employed to refer
variously to concepts, dynamical properties, phenomena,
laws, or theories, without regard for the subtle but im-
portant distinctions. While Bohr often left it to his read-
ers to decipher the precise meaning of ambiguous phrases
1 As Catherine Chevalley points out, “what makes Bohr so difficult
to read is the fact that his views were identified with the so-called
‘Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,’ when such
a thing emerged as a frame for philosophical discussion only in
the mid-1950s” (Chevalley 1999, p. 59). We must be clear that
the term “Copenhagen interpretation,” as it is commonly used,
refers to a range of different physical and philosophical perspec-
tives that emerged in the decades following the establishment of
quantum mechanics in the late 1920s. As Jammer points out in
his Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: “The Copenhagen inter-
pretation is not a single, clear-cut, unambiguously defined set of
ideas but rather a common denominator for a variety of related
viewpoints. Nor is it necessarily linked with a specific philosoph-
ical or ideological position” (Jammer 1974, p. 87). Indeed the
very idea of a unitary interpretation only seems to have emerged
in the 1950s in the context of the challenge of Soviet Marxist cri-
tique of quantum mechanics, and in the defense of Bohr’s views,
albeit from different epistemological standpoints, by Heisenberg
and Rosenfeld (Camilleri 2009a, Chevalley 1999, Howard 2004).
such as “classical description,” in his more deliberate mo-
ments he did take care to distinguish between the use of
classical concepts (such as position and momentum) and
classical dynamical theories. In his reply to the EPR
paper, for example, Bohr emphasized the necessity of us-
ing “classical concepts in the interpretation of all proper
measurements, even though the classical theories do not
suffice in accounting for the new types of regularities with
which we are concerned in atomic physics” (Bohr 1935,
p. 701, emphasis added). Bohr was also careful to dis-
tinguish between our use of classical terminology and the
dynamical properties of quantum objects. As he recog-
nized, objects like electrons simply do not possess “such
inherent attributes as the idealizations of classical physics
would ascribe to the object” (Bohr 1937, p. 293). Yet,
Bohr repeatedly emphasized that we are simply forced
to use the conceptual vocabulary of classical physics, al-
beit within certain limits of applicability, in describing
experiments on quantum objects. Put simply, whenever
we speak of an indeterminacy of an electron’s position or
momentum, we invariably fall back on the use of classi-
cal concepts. It was in this sense that Bohr used expres-
sions such as “the terminology of classical physics” or the
“framework of classical physical ideas.”
The interpretation of Bohr’s doctrine we present in this
paper differs in many crucial respects from those that
can be found in the extensive literature on Bohr. There
is now consensus among Bohr scholars that his doctrine
of classical concepts should be understood epistemologi-
cally. However, there is still widespread disagreement on
what epistemological position Bohr held. Much of the
recent literature has attempted to make sense of Bohr’s
views either by situating them in the context of a partic-
ular philosophical tradition, such as positivism or Kan-
tianism, or alternatively by trying to reconstruct from
Bohr’s writings, a position vis-a`-vis the contemporary re-
alism debates.2 As Henry Folse rightly points out, while
it is true that Bohr’s “description of phenomenal objects
has a certain Kant-like appearance,” such an appearance
is deceptive, given that complementarity has nothing to
do with “how experiences phenomena arise in the sub-
ject’s consciousness” (Folse 1985, p. 219). If we are to
2 The contributions by Favrholdt, Fay, Folse, Krips, McKinnon in
the 1994 volume on Bohr all focus on the extent to which Bohr’s
views depart from a realist interpretation of the theory of quan-
tum mechanics (Faye and Folse 1994; see also Faye 1991, Folse
1985). Murdoch, for example, has construed Bohr’s disagree-
ment with Einstein fundamentally as a debate about the realist
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Murdoch 1987, p. 236).
There have been a number of efforts to draw comparisons be-
tween Bohr’s views and Kantian epistemology (Bitbol 2013; Cuf-
faro 2010; Kaiser 1992; Murdoch 1987, pp. 229–231; Folse 1985,
pp. 217–221; Honner 1982). More recently there have been
renewed efforts to make sense of Bohr’s writings by situating
them in the Helmholtzian tradition of theoretical physics, or to
read them through the lens of philosophical traditions such as
hermeneutics and deconstruction (Brock 2003, Katsumori 2011,
Plotnitsky 1994).
3understand what was distinctive about Bohr’s view, we
cannot simply say it was grounded in an epistemologi-
cal view of the primacy of classical language—rather we
must ask what Bohr saw as the fundamental “task of epis-
temology.” While the attempts to characterize Bohr’s
view with relation to different strands of realism and an-
tirealism have led to many important insights, and have
happily led to a far more nuanced view of his philosophy
than the positivist image that prevailed in the 1960s,
such attempts have often inadvertently obscured Bohr’s
“epistemological lesson.” In responding to the challenge
of the EPR paper, Bohr was, of course, forced to confront
issues concerning the “completeness of quantum mechan-
ics,” but his doctrine of classical concepts, as we stress
below, was not motivated by the problem of how to inter-
pret the quantum-mechanical formalism. Bohr’s primary
concern was to articulate an epistemology of experiment,
not an epistemology of quantum theory. Here we adhere
to Collingwood’s dictum that “we can understand a text
only when we have understood the question to which it
is an answer.”
This brings us to a second question, which forms an-
other focus of this paper: What is the relationship of
Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts, and in particularly
his understanding of the classical description of experi-
ment, to the problem of the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion, i.e., the problem of the “crossings” of the quantum–
classical boundary? In this paper, we argue that much
of the confusion surrounding this question stems from
the failure to properly distinguish between Bohr’s epis-
temological thesis concerning a functional description of
experiment, and the efforts to provide a dynamical ex-
planation of the emergence of classicality from quantum
theory. While Bohr offered some remarks on the latter
through his oblique references to the “heaviness” of the
apparatus, his main preoccupation was with the former.
A deeper understanding of this difference between Bohr’s
epistemological reflections on experiment and the transi-
tion between quantum and classical dynamics turns out
to be crucial to overcoming many of the persistent diffi-
culties in making sense of Bohr’s views.
In addressing these questions, this paper is divided
into two main parts. The first part provides a reading
of Bohr’s understanding of the epistemological primacy
of a classical description, based on a functional, rather
than a structural, understanding of what an experiment
is. While much of the literature on Bohr has focused
on the use of classical concepts in any complementary
description of the quantum object, in this paper we in-
stead devote much of our attention to his contention that
the experimental apparatus must be described in terms
of the concepts of classical physics. Here the work of Pe-
ter Kroes (Kroes 1994, 2003) turns out to be particularly
instructive in bringing to light aspects of Bohr’s episte-
mology that have otherwise been ignored. A deeper in-
sight into Bohr’s view of experiment is revealed through
a close examination of his important, but often over-
looked, disagreement with Heisenberg in the 1930s re-
garding how to understand the dividing line, or “cut,”
between quantum object and instrument. A close reading
of their correspondence, unpublished manuscripts, and
published writings during this period conclusively dis-
pels the myth that Heisenberg’s articulation of the “cut”
argument can be taken as a faithful representation of
Bohr’s own position. This provides further evidence of
the extent to which Bohr’s contemporaries, in pursuing
their own philosophical agendas, often diverged from his
basic insights.
The second part of this paper examines the history
of attempts to come to grips with the dynamical prob-
lem of the quantum-to-classical transition. As we will
show, a number of Bohr’s followers attempted to provide
a dynamical reformulation of Bohr’s general views after
the Second World War. These attempts typically took
the form of investigating the thermodynamic conditions
under which interference terms would effectively vanish
at the macroscopic scale. While most of these attempts
ended in failure, they did not, as we shall argue, signify a
departure from Bohr’s general epistemological viewpoint,
and they did yield some surprising insights. Perhaps
most notably, Heisenberg took the crucial step of em-
phasizing the importance of the openness of quantum sys-
tems in his brief remarks on the problem of the quantum-
to-classical transition in the 1950s. Yet it was only with
the deeper understanding, brought about by decoherence
theory, of the role of entanglement with the environment
that the dynamical problem of the quantum-to-classical
transition could be properly addressed.
This paper does not aim to mount a sustained defense
of Bohr’s view. Rather, our aim is to offer an inter-
pretation of Bohr, based on a close reading of his pri-
mary texts and reconstructive analysis, that reveals the
extent to which his basic insights were consistent with
attempts to find a dynamical solution to the problem
of the quantum-to-classical transition, which culminated
with the development of decoherence theory. Though
we do not aim to defend Bohr, it will become apparent
that many of the standard criticisms of his viewpoint are
based on a failure to understand him on his own terms. It
is our hope that this investigation will establish a more
refined understanding of Bohr’s views, and that it will
raise awareness and appreciation of the complex connec-
tions between Bohr’s views, the views of his followers, and
the contributions made by dynamical approaches such as
decoherence.
II. BOHR’S DOCTRINE OF CLASSICAL
CONCEPTS
A. Niels Bohr as Philosopher of Experiment
Bohr’s doctrine of the indispensability of classical con-
cepts made a deep and lasting impression on a younger
generation of physicists who at various times worked
closely with Bohr in Copenhagen. Wolfgang Pauli,
4Werner Heisenberg, Le´on Rosenfeld, and Aage Petersen
all saw as Bohr’s epistemological reflections on quantum
mechanics as containing a deep insight into the nature
of human knowledge. At the same time, Bohr’s unwa-
vering commitment to his view of classical concepts was
an enduring source of puzzlement for many of his con-
temporaries. In a letter to Bohr on 13 October 1935,
Schro¨dinger pressed Bohr to clarify the reasons for his
view:
You have repeatedly expressed your definite
conviction that measurements must be de-
scribed in terms of classical concepts . . . .
There must be clear and definite reasons
which cause you repeatedly to declare that we
must interpret observations in classical terms,
according to their very nature. . . . It must be
among your firmest convictions—and I can-
not understand what it is based upon. (Bohr
1996, p. 508, emphasis in the original).
In his reply to Schro¨dinger on 26 October 1935, Bohr
offered the following remarks:
My emphasis of the point that the classi-
cal description of experiments is unavoid-
able amounts merely to the seemingly obvi-
ous fact that the description of any measuring
arrangements must, in an essential manner,
involve the arrangement of the instruments
in space and their functioning in time, if we
shall be able to state anything at all about the
phenomena (Bohr 1996, p. 511, emphasis in
the original).
Bohr’s reply to Schro¨dinger appears, at least on the sur-
face, to shed very little light on the matter. As we shall
see, however, it contains an important clue to under-
standing Bohr’s views. Here it is crucial to note Bohr’s
emphasis on the classical description of the experiment
as a condition of the possibility of acquiring empirical
knowledge of the phenomena under investigation. In
Bohr’s view, if a macroscopic system is to serve as a
measuring instrument, it must admit of a classical de-
scription.
In order to understand why Bohr was convinced of this
point, we must first recognize that from the late 1920s on,
Bohr understood that the idea of a classical concept of an
isolated “object” that has a well-defined “state” and that
interacts with a measuring instrument is rendered prob-
lematic in quantum mechanics. Bohr recognized that this
posed something of a paradox for the concept of obser-
vation. On the one hand, in order to observe something
about an electron—say, its momentum—we must assume
that the electron possesses an independent dynamical
state (momentum), which is in principle distinguishable
from the state of the instrument with which it inter-
acts. On the other hand, such an interaction, if treated
quantum-mechanically, destroys the separability of the
object and the instrument, since the resulting entangle-
ment between the two partners means that they must be
described by a single composite nonseparable quantum
state. The impossibility of “separating the behaviour
of the objects from their interaction with the measuring
instruments” in quantum mechanics “implies an ambi-
guity in assigning conventional attributes to atomic ob-
jects” (Bohr 1948, p. 317). A quantum-mechanical treat-
ment of the observational interaction would paradoxically
make the very distinction between object and instrument
ambiguous. But such a distinction is a necessary con-
dition for empirical inquiry. After all, an experiment
is carried out precisely to reveal information about the
“autonomous behavior of a physical object” (Bohr 1937,
p. 290). To speak of an interaction between two sepa-
rate systems—an object and measuring instrument—is
to speak in terms of classical physics. This basic point is
repeated time and time again in Bohr’s writings through-
out the 1940s and 1950s.
For Bohr, this point lay at the heart of the epistemo-
logical paradox of quantum mechanics. He regarded the
condition of isolation to be a simple logical demand, be-
cause, without such a presupposition, an electron cannot
be an “object” of empirical knowledge at all. The crucial
point, as Bohr explained at the 1936 “Unity of Science”
congress, is that contrary to the situation in classical
physics, in quantum mechanics “it is no longer possible
sharply to distinguish between the autonomous behavior
of a physical object and its inevitable interaction with
other bodies serving as measuring instruments,” yet it
lies in “the very nature of the concept of observation it-
self” that we can draw such a distinction (Bohr 1937,
p. 290). Bohr elaborated on this point at some length
from his 1937 lecture “Natural Philosophy and Human
Cultures”:
We are faced here with an epistemological
problem quite new in natural philosophy,
where all description of experiences so far has
been based on the assumption, already inher-
ent in the ordinary conventions of language,
that it is possible to distinguish sharply be-
tween the behaviour of objects and the means
of observation. This assumption is not only
fully justified by everyday experience, but
even constitutes the whole basis of classical
physics . . . . [In light of this situation] we are,
therefore, forced to examine more closely the
question of what kind of knowledge can be ob-
tained concerning objects. In this respect, we
must . . . realize that the aim of every physical
experiment—to gain knowledge under repro-
ducible and communicable conditions—leaves
us no choice but to use everyday concepts,
perhaps refined by the terminology of classical
physics, not only in accounts of the construc-
tion and manipulation of measuring instru-
ments but also in the description of actual
experimental results (Bohr 1987a, pp. 25–6,
5emphasis added).
As this passage makes clear, Bohr’s philosophical preoc-
cupations were essentially of an epistemological nature.
The real question for Bohr was not what kind of reality
is described by quantum mechanics, but rather “what
kind of knowledge can be obtained concerning objects”
by means of experiment. Thus, for Bohr, the epistemo-
logical problem of quantum mechanics was not how we
should interpret the formalism, but rather how experi-
mental knowledge of quantum objects is possible. To this
extent, Bohr’s philosophical preoccupations were funda-
mentally at odds with, or at least rather different from,
what many philosophers of physics see as the problem
of quantum mechanics, namely, the interpretation of its
formalism. To put it simply, Bohr’s doctrine of classical
concepts is not primarily an interpretation of quantum
mechanics (although it certainly bears on it), but rather
is an attempt by Bohr to elaborate an epistemology of
experiment.
In order to bring out this point clearly, it is instructive
to borrow the terminology employed by Peter Kroes in
his distinction between a structural and a functional de-
scription of an experimental apparatus: “The structural
description represents the object [serving as the measur-
ing instrument] as a physical system, whereas the func-
tional description represents the object as a technological
artifact” (Kroes 2003, p. 76). While it is always possible
to conceptualize a measuring instrument, such as a mer-
cury thermometer, “from a purely physical (structural)
point of view” as an object with certain dynamical prop-
erties and obeying physical laws, the same object can
also be described “from an intentional (functional) point
of view” as an instrument designed “to measure a partic-
ular physical quantity” such as temperature. From the
epistemological point of view, the functional description
is more fundamental (Kroes 2003, p. 75). As Kroes ex-
plains:
Every experiment has a goal (to measure x
or to detect y, or to show phenomenon z,
etc.) and it is in relation to this goal that
every part of the experimental setup is at-
tributed a function, as well as actions per-
formed during the experiment. For describing
and understanding an experiment, reference
to functions is unavoidable. In contrast the
description of the results of the outcome of an
experiment (the observations, data, measure-
ments) is free of any reference to functions
at all . . . . Thus whereas experiments are de-
scribed in a functional way, the description
of the results of experiments and of physical
reality as constructed on the basis of those re-
sults is of a structural kind. This means that
the structural description of physical reality
rests implicitly on a functional description of
at least part of the world (Kroes 2003, p. 74,
emphasis added).
This passage provides a valuable insight through which
we can make good sense of why Bohr saw it as neces-
sary to draw an epistemological distinction between the
functioning of the instrument and the object under in-
vestigation. Indeed, the language Kroes employs here
bears a strikingly similarity with the way Bohr often ex-
pressed himself. In his discussion of the interaction of
object and instrument, Bohr always refers to the aims
and functions of the experiment. Here it is worth noting
that for Kroes, a “functional description also makes use
of structural concepts; it makes reference to the struc-
tural properties of the object [serving as the measuring
instrument], not only in describing but also in explaining
the design features of the object” (Kroes 2003, p. 76).
Bohr’s central insight was that if a measuring instru-
ment is to serve its purpose of furnishing us with knowl-
edge of an object, it must be described classically. Of
course, it is always possible to represent the experimental
apparatus from a purely structural point of view, without
any reference to its function, as a quantum-mechanical
system. However, any functional description of the ex-
perimental apparatus, in which it is treated as a means
to an end and not merely as a dynamical system, must
make use of the concepts of a classical physics. This is
true even when we measure quantum properties, such as
spin. In the Stern–Gerlach experiment, for example, the
experimental apparatus and the magnetic field must be
treated classically for the purpose of performing the ex-
periment. Put simply, any functional description of the
experimental apparatus must be a classical description.
In Bohr’s view, “all unambiguous information concerning
atomic objects is derived from permanent marks—such
as a spot on a photographic plate, caused by the im-
pact of an electron—left on the bodies which define the
experimental conditions” (Bohr 1958b, p. 310). In his
1958 lecture “On Atoms and Human Knowledge,” Bohr
expanded on this point:
In the analysis of single atomic particles,
this is made possible by irreversible ampli-
fication effects—such as a spot on a photo-
graphic plate left by the impact of an elec-
tron, or an electric discharge created in a
counter device—and the observations concern
only where and when the particle is registered
on the plate or its energy on arrival with the
counter. Of course, this information presup-
poses knowledge of the position of the pho-
tographic plate relative to other parts of the
experimental arrangement, such as regulat-
ing diaphragms and shutters defining space-
time coordination or electrified and magne-
tized bodies which determine the external
force fields acting on the particle and per-
mit energy measurements. The experimen-
tal conditions can be varied in many ways,
but the point is that in each case we must
be able to communicate to others what we
have done and what we have learned, and
6that therefore the functioning of the measur-
ing instruments must be described within the
framework of classical physical ideas (Bohr
1958a, pp. 169–170, emphasis added).
The properties of the quantum object, such as its po-
sition, charge, spin and energy, can only be known by
virtue of traces it leaves on an experimental system. It
must be possible to interpret the results of the experi-
ment in such a way that the visible and permanent traces
on the apparatus can be dynamically explained as hav-
ing been caused by the object under investigation. If
this were not the case—if no such causal inferences were
possible—then such systems could not provide us with
knowledge of the dynamical properties of the quantum
object. To this end, we must presuppose a causal chain
of events triggered by the object itself, through the ap-
paratus, finally registering at the macroscopic scale if the
measuring apparatus is to serve its purpose. Or, to put it
another way, it must be possible to trace this “sequence of
cause and effect” back from the observation of a spot on
a photographic plate or an electric discharge in a counter
device, to the object itself. In this sense, “the concept
of causality underlies the very interpretation of each re-
sult of experiment” insofar as it forms the basis of any
functional description (Bohr 1937, p. 293).
B. The “Cut” between Object and Apparatus:
Bohr’s Disagreement with Heisenberg
The reading of Bohr presented above, it should be
stressed, does not presuppose any particular ontological
division of the world into quantum and classical realms.
There is, for Bohr, no fundamental ontological difference
between the quantum object and the experimental ap-
paratus we use to investigate the world. Much of the
confusion surrounding Bohr’s views stems from a ten-
dency to read him as having “split the physical world
into a quantum microcosm and a classical macrocosm”
(Osnaghi et al. 2009, p. 102). Yet, Bohr’s discrimination
“between those parts of the physical system . . . which
are to be treated as measuring instruments and those
which constitute the objects under investigation” was de-
termined by functional-structural (epistemological) con-
siderations and not by dynamical (ontological) consider-
ations (Bohr 1935, p. 701).
However, a deeper understanding of Bohr’s episte-
mological viewpoint requires us to disentangle it from
a viewpoint that has often been attributed to him.
Bohr did not, as is commonly assumed, see the object-
instrument divide as entailing a quantum–classical di-
vide, at least not in the sense of different realms of dy-
namical laws. This view of Bohr has persisted, in large
part, because it was a view attributed to Bohr by many
of his contemporaries, and even by some of his closest col-
laborators. The chief offender here is Heisenberg, whose
discussion of the “cut” between the object and instru-
ment in the 1930s has shaped the contemporary read-
ing of Bohr. As we shall see, however, Bohr never en-
dorsed Heisenberg’s view of the cut, and indeed raised
certain objections to Heisenberg in their private corre-
spondence. According to this commonly held view, which
Don Howard has labeled the coincidence interpretation,
“the experimental apparatus is to be given a classical
description in its entirety, while the object is described
by means of quantum mechanics” (Howard 1994, p. 203).
Yet, contrary to what some commentators have assumed,
Bohr never endorsed such a view.3 Erhard Scheibe, in his
otherwise penetrating analysis of Bohr’s views, attributes
to Bohr the coincidence interpretation in his discussion
of the use of mutually exclusive experimental arrange-
ments in measuring the position and momentum of a
particle. In Scheibe’s view, Bohr held that in such cases,
the “part of the experimental arrangements that is ini-
tially described in classical terms is converted into the
object and thus must be described in quantum-theoretical
terms, whereas the requirement of classical description
is applied to different parts of the experimental arrange-
ment” (Scheibe 1973, p. 48, emphasis added). This view,
however, rests on a misreading of Bohr.
Put simply, Bohr never described the measurement in-
teraction between the quantum object and the appara-
tus as an interaction between an object described by a
wave function in configuration space and a measuring
instrument described by classical dynamical laws in ordi-
nary three-dimensional space. As Howard rightly notes,
this reading of Bohr is deeply problematic insofar as it
“introduces a dualism into our ontology”; it also raises
the further problem of how the two systems “described
by fundamentally different theories” interact with each
other, given that such an interaction does not appear to
be subsumed under either classical or quantum theory
(Howard 1994, p. 211). Bohr insisted that the concepts
of classical physics must be used on both sides of the div-
ing line. This is because, as Bohr emphasized, “a mea-
surement can mean nothing else than the unambiguous
comparison of some property of the object under investi-
gation with a corresponding property of another system,
serving as a measuring instrument” (Bohr 1939, p. 19).
Such comparisons invariably involve the use of classical
concepts.
Some clarification is in order here. In Bohr’s view,
whereas a functional description of the experimental ap-
paratus must make some use of classical dynamical theo-
ries (like Newton’s or Maxwell’s laws), the corresponding
3 Although we agree with Howard that Bohr did not endorse the
coincidence interpretation, our reading differs from Howard’s
“reconstruction” of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts. Ac-
cording to Howard, Bohr’s mutually exclusive experimental ar-
rangements may be identified with the choice of effective mixed
states (ignorance-interpretable mixtures; see d’Espagnat 1976)
conditioned on the particular measurement setup (Howard 1994).
Howard emphasized that “Bohr required a classical description
of some, but not necessarily all, features of the instrument and
more surprisingly, perhaps, a classical description of some fea-
tures of the observed object as well” (Howard 1994, p. 203).
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be a partial, classical description. Here we are obliged to
make use of different classical concepts in mutually ex-
clusive experimental arrangements. As Bohr would put
it, “evidence obtained under different experimental con-
ditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture,
but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that
only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible
information about the objects” (Bohr 1949, p. 210). To
this extent, Bohr argued that in our experimental inves-
tigation of the kinematic-dynamic behaviour of quantum
objects, we are forced to “use two different experimental
arrangements, of which only one permits the unambigu-
ous use of the concept of position, while only the other
permits the application of the concept of momentum”
(Bohr 1937, p. 293, emphasis added). To this extent,
the situation in quantum mechanics brings to light the
“previously unrecognized presuppositions for an unam-
biguous use of our most simple concepts” (Bohr 1937,
p. 290). While a more detailed investigation of comple-
mentarity is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be
clear that the coincidence interpretation does not form
part of Bohr’s general outlook.
Having now clarified Bohr’s view, we can turn our at-
tention to Heisenberg. In a widely read article appear-
ing in Naturwissenschaften in 1934 (Heisenberg 1952b),
Heisenberg gave perhaps his earliest articulation of the
coincidence interpretation. There he argued that “in a
mathematical treatment of the process, a dividing line
must be drawn between, on the one hand, the apparatus
which we use as an aid in putting the question and thus,
in a way, treat as part of ourselves, and on the other hand,
the physical systems we wish to investigate” (Heisenberg
1952b, p. 15). Heisenberg went on to construe this di-
viding line as a cut [Schnitt ] “between the measuring
apparatus of the observer which is described in classical
concepts, and the object under observation, whose be-
havior is represented by a wave function” (Heisenberg
1952b, p. 15, emphasis added). This view was reiter-
ated in a lecture in November 1935 in Vienna, in which
Heisenberg argued that where we chose to place the div-
ing line between the quantum and classical description
“is immediately defined by the nature of the problem
but it obviously signifies no discontinuity of the physi-
cal process. For this reason there must, within certain
limits, exist complete freedom in choosing the position
of the dividing line” (Heisenberg 1952a, p. 49, emphasis
added).
Perhaps the most developed version of the “cut”
argument can be found in Heisenberg’s unpublished
manuscript, entitled “Ist eine deterministische Erga¨n-
zung der Quantenmechanik mo¨glich?” (“Is a determin-
istic completion of quantum mechanics possible?”) and
written some time in June 1935. Heisenberg wrote the
paper in response to the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paper
and the recent criticisms from physicists like Schro¨dinger
and Laue, with the intention of submitting it for publica-
tion in the journal Naturwissenschaften. After learning,
however, that Bohr was drafting his own reply to the
EPR paper, he decided against publication. He sent a
copy of the manuscript to Pauli on 2 July 1935 (Pauli
1985, pp. 409–18, item 414), and enclosed a copy in
a letter to Bohr on 10 August, for comment. In the
manuscript, Heisenberg emphasized that in any measure-
ment scenario, the position of the “cut can be shifted ar-
bitrarily far in the direction of the observer in the region
that can otherwise be described according to the laws of
classical physics,” but “the cut cannot be shifted arbi-
trarily in the direction of the atomic system” described,
as it is, by the Schro¨dinger wave equation in configu-
ration space (Heisenberg 1985, p. 414). Heisenberg ac-
knowledged that strictly speaking, the laws of quantum
mechanics are applicable to all systems (including the
measuring instrument), but that “it is precisely the arbi-
trariness in the choice of the location of the cut that
is decisive for the application of quantum mechanics”
(Heisenberg 1985, p. 416).4
Heisenberg’s view of the mobility of the quantum–
classical divide is often taken to be a central planck of
Bohr’s view of quantum mechanics. According to Wo-
jciech Zurek: “The key feature of the Copenhagen In-
terpretation is the dividing line between quantum and
classical. Bohr emphasized that the border must be mo-
bile” (Zurek 1991). However, such pronouncements are
misleading, and by September 1935, it is evident that
there were crucial, and often-overlooked, differences be-
tween Bohr and Heisenberg. While Bohr never openly
or publicly criticized Heisenberg’s view of “cut,” a close
reading of their correspondence, written in August and
September of 1935, brings to light their hidden disagree-
ment (AHQP 1986, Heisenberg to Bohr 10 August 1935,
Bohr to Heisenberg 10 September 1935, Bohr to Heisen-
berg 15 September 1935, Heisenberg to Bohr 29 Septem-
ber 1935). While in his reply to the EPR paper (which
he submitted to Physical Review in July 1935), Bohr did
refer to the “free choice” of where we choose to place
the object–apparatus divide, he never expressed this di-
vide in terms of the distinction between the quantum and
classical mechanics. Writing to Heisenberg after reading
4 Elise Crull and Guido Bacciagaluppi have recently translated
Heisenberg’s unpublished paper into English and have made a de-
tailed critical analysis of the argument (Crull and Bacciagaluppi
2011). Crull notes that the structure of Heisenberg’s argument
is founded on two premises: first, that the location of the cut
is arbitrary (i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are
independent of the position of the cut), and secondly, that the
statistical element of quantum mechanics can only enter at the
location of the cut. The paper offers a defense of both premises,
from which Heisenberg draws the conclusion that a determinis-
tic completion of quantum mechanics is impossible. However,
as Crull points out, Heisenberg’s formal treatment of the mea-
surement interaction contains a flaw, in that the object and the
measuring apparatus are represented by separable wave func-
tions immediately after the interaction between them has taken
place. Here Heisenberg fails to recognize that according to quan-
tum mechanics, they will remain in an entangled state after the
interaction has taken place.
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self unable to agree with the line of argument contained
in the paper:
I have experienced difficulties by trying to un-
derstand more clearly the argumentation in
your article. For I am not quite sure that I
fully understand the importance you attach
to the freedom of shifting the cut between
the object and the measuring apparatus.
Any well-defined quantum-mechanical prob-
lem must be concerned with a certain clas-
sically described experimental setting, and if
one changes the kind or use of the measuring
instruments, and thus the setting, the phe-
nomenon will always change completely. I
therefore believe that for a given experimen-
tal setting the cut is determined by the na-
ture of the problem . . . . Moreover, I do not
fully understand how the mentioned narrow
possibility of shifting the cut at any given ex-
perimental setting can be used in connection
with the particular problem of measurement,
which you proceed to deal with (AHQP 1986,
Bohr to Heisenberg, 15 September 1935).5
As the letter to Heisenberg makes clear, and con-
trary to what John Bell and many other commenta-
tors have assumed, Bohr evidently did not “take great
satisfaction” in “the shiftiness of the division between
‘quantum system’ and ‘classical apparatus’ ” (Bell 1987,
p. 189). In Bohr’s view, once the aims of the experi-
ment had been decided upon and the experimental ap-
paratus has been set up accordingly, the “cut” was ef-
fectively fixed. It could not be moved around arbitrar-
ily. To this extent, Bohr argued that the cut corre-
sponds to something “objective” in the sense that the
object–instrument distinction was essentially fixed by the
functional-epistemological considerations dictated by the
choice of the particular experimental arrangement.
In a letter replying to Bohr in September 1935, Heisen-
berg simply reiterated his view that without the presup-
position of a moving cut, one would have to conclude that
there exist “two categories of physical systems—classical
and quantum-mechanical ones” (AHQP 1986, Heisenberg
to Bohr 29 September 1935). Bohr’s criticisms, which
were guided by epistemological considerations, appear to
have had little effect. Heisenberg presented the same
argument we find in his unpublished manuscript, albeit
in a somewhat abbreviated form, in his Vienna lecture
in November 1935. Here it seems Heisenberg simply as-
sumed that the empirical object could be described as
a wave function in configuration space. Yet for Bohr,
“the appropriate physical interpretation of the symbolic
5 We would like to thank Helge Kragh for translating Bohr’s letter
from the original Danish.
quantum-mechanical formalism amounts only to predic-
tions, of determinate or statistical character, pertaining
to individual phenomena appearing under conditions de-
fined by classical physical concepts” (Bohr 1949, p. 238).
In order to describe the particular empirical phenomena
that reveal themselves under experimental conditions, we
must use the concepts of classical physics.
This fundamental disagreement between Bohr and
Heisenberg was never resolved. In his 1955–6 Gifford lec-
tures, Heisenberg openly acknowledged that in contrast
with his own view of the movability of the cut, “Bohr
has emphasized that it is more realistic to state that the
division into the object and rest of the world is not ar-
bitrary” but rather is determined by the very nature of
the experiment (Heisenberg 1989, p. 24). This point is
repeated in a letter to Patrick Heelan in 1975, in which
Heisenberg again drew attention to the fact that he and
Bohr had never reached agreement about “whether the
cut between that part of the experiment which should
be described in classical terms and the other quantum-
theoretical part had a well defined position or not” (Hee-
lan 1975, p. 137). As he recalled: “I argued that a cut
could be moved around to some extent while Bohr pre-
ferred to think that the position is uniquely defined in ev-
ery experiment” (Heelan 1975, p. 137). Weizsa¨cker also
provides a similar account of this difference of opinion be-
tween Bohr and Heisenberg, which first came to light in
the 1930s (Weizsa¨cker 1987, p. 283). A historical under-
standing of this disagreement provides a crucial insight
into Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts.
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE
QUANTUM-TO-CLASSICAL TRANSITION
A. The Equivalence of Quantum and Classical
Descriptions
Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts, as we have ar-
gued in the previous section, is an epistemological the-
sis based on a functional understanding of experiment.
Yet, as many commentators have pointed out, while Bohr
insisted that we must employ the concepts of classical
physics to describe whatever part of the system we have
designated to function as a measuring instrument, it is
always possible to give a quantum-mechanical description
of the apparatus in its entirety. Bohr acknowledged that
measuring instruments, like all systems, macroscopic or
microscopic, are strictly speaking subject to the laws of
quantum mechanics. As he explained at the Warsaw con-
ference in 1938:
In the system to which the quantum mechan-
ical formalism is to be applied, it is of course
possible to include any intermediate auxil-
iary agency employed in the measuring pro-
cess. Since, however, all those properties of
such agencies which, according to the aim of
measurements have to be compared with the
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be described on classical lines, their quantum
mechanical treatment will for this purpose be
essentially equivalent with a classical descrip-
tion (Bohr 1939, pp. 23–24, emphasis added).
While it is of course always possible to describe the ap-
paratus as a quantum-mechanical system, Bohr insists
that in doing so we would forfeit a functional account of
the experiment as a means of acquiring empirical knowl-
edge. Measuring instruments, for Bohr, must admit of
a classical description, otherwise they could not perform
their epistemic function as measuring instruments. To
this extent, any “quantum mechanical treatment” of a
measuring instrument will, by virtue of its function as
a measuring instrument, “be essentially equivalent with
a classical description.” However, this raises the further
question of why, from a purely dynamical point of view,
the quantum-mechanical treatment is essentially equiva-
lent to a classical description. As Kroes points out, from
such a structural point of view, the design and geomet-
ric configuration of the apparatus “is just some physical
property” and “a completely contingent feature of the
object” (Kroes 2003, p. 76).
Bohr’s epistemological explanation for why we must
use a classical description thus begs the question of what
dynamical features of a macroscopic system entitle us
to neglect the “quantum effects.” Bohr here appears to
simply assume that there exists a macroscopic “region
where the quantum-mechanical description of the pro-
cess concerned is effectively equivalent with the classical
description” (Bohr 1935, p. 701). Thus we are led to ask:
How is it that classical physics can be employed, at least
to a very good approximation, under certain dynamical
conditions (typically those corresponding to measuring
scenarios)? This is a salient question, given that, strictly
speaking, the world, as Bohr recognized, is nonclassical.
Bohr never provided a sustained or satisfactory dy-
namical explanation for the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion, leaving only fleeting remarks scattered throughout
his writings. He seems to have regarded the explana-
tion as trivial, and on most occasions has been content
to refer to the “massive” nature of macroscopic bodies
serving as measuring instruments. A functional account
of the experiment “is secured by the use, as measuring
instruments, of rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow
a completely classical account of their relative positions
and velocities” (Bohr 1958b, p. 310, emphasis added).
One finds a similar view expressed on several occasions in
Bohr’s later writings. As he put it in 1958, “all measure-
ments thus concern bodies sufficiently heavy to permit
the quantum [effects] to be neglected in their descrip-
tion” (Bohr 1958a, p. 170, emphasis added). But, one
might well ask, how heavy is “sufficiently heavy”?
In his reconstruction of Bohr’s views, Howard attempts
to provide an answer to the question of how Bohr thought
it was possible that a classical description can be “essen-
tially equivalent to a quantum mechanical one” (Howard
1994, pp. 217). While Howard regards his reconstruction,
which employs a formal quantum-mechanical description
of experimental arrangements in terms of a “mixtures
model,” as perfectly “consistent with Bohr’s remarks on
observation and classical concepts,” he admits there is
no evidence to suggest that Bohr ever explicitly con-
sidered an “appropriate mixtures” model (Howard 1994,
pp. 225). To this end, Howard concedes that “one is
forced to go beyond the record of Bohr’s words and their
meanings” (Howard 1994, pp. 204). Many of these dif-
ficulties can be avoided, however, if we distinguish be-
tween Bohr’s epistemological doctrine of classical con-
cepts (on which he said a great deal) and his views on the
quantum–classical transition (on which Bohr said very
little). On the few occasions when Bohr did discuss the
latter, he typically appealed to the “heaviness” or the
“macroscopic dimensions” of the measuring apparatus.
Yet, as Hugh Everett stressed in a letter to Aage Pe-
tersen in May 1957, this assumption was problematic for
the “Copenhagen school”:
You talk of the massiveness of macrosystems
allowing one to neglect further quantum ef-
fects . . . but never give any justification of
this flatly asserted dogma. Is it an indepen-
dent postulate? It most certainly does not
follow from wave mechanics . . . . In fact by
the very formulation of your viewpoint you
are totally incapable of any justification and
must make it an independent postulate—that
macrosystems are relatively immune to quan-
tum effects. (Everett to Petersen, 31 May
1957, Wheeler Papers, Series I—Box Di—
Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett, quoted in
Osnaghi et al. 2009, p. 106).
Everett’s comments here go to the heart of the mat-
ter. While he never seems to have appreciated the sub-
tleties of Bohr’s epistemological position, he did pin-
point the dynamical problem of the quantum-to-classical
transition. Bohr appears to have simply assumed that
any macroscopic system serving as a measuring in-
strument must be describable by means of a classical
approximation—otherwise we could not rely on such sys-
tem to perform experiments. It is simply the case that
without such a presupposition, experimental knowledge
would be rendered impossible. The task then fell to
Bohr’s followers to provide an adequate dynamical ac-
count of why this is so. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
a number of Bohr’s disciples, including Rosenfeld, Pe-
tersen, and Groenwald, became increasingly preoccupied
with the problem of the quantum-to-classical transition.
In their article on the reception of Everett’s relative-
state interpretation in Copenhagen, Osnaghi, Freitas,
and Freire make the observation that “the arguments
put forward by the Copenhagen group” often “involved
(and sometimes mixed up) two different levels of reflec-
tion” (Osnaghi et al. 2009, p. 116). On the one hand,
the “Copenhagen group” embraced Bohr’s “pragmatic-
transcendental argument” for the possibility of experi-
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mental knowledge, while on the other hand, they also at-
tempted to give “a physical explanation” of the quantum-
to-classical transition for macroscopic systems (Osnaghi
et al. 2009, p. 116). This attempt—the reformulation
of Bohr’s epistemological doctrine in physical terms—
assumed crucial importance in the 1950s and 1960s and
generated much debate and discussion. What is perhaps
remarkable about this situation is that both critics and
defenders of Bohr’s viewpoint saw the need to arrive at a
deeper understanding of the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion.
B. Irreversibility and the Dynamical Problem of
the Quantum-to-Classical Transition
In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of Bohr’s followers
turned their attention to the dynamical problem of the
quantum-to-classical transition amidst the new wave of
criticisms of quantum mechanics. Commenting on re-
cent attempts in this direction in 1965, Rosenfeld ar-
gued that “it is understandable that in order to exhibit
more directly the link between the physical concepts and
their mathematical representation, a more formal render-
ing of Bohr’s argument should be attempted” (Rosen-
feld 1979, p. 536). In spite of their philosophical differ-
ences, many of Bohr’s followers, such as Weizsa¨cker and
Rosenfeld, pursued this kind of approach to the physics of
the quantum-to-classical transition as entirely in keeping
with the spirit in which Bohr had intended his doctrine
of classical concepts.
As Weizsa¨cker put it at a colloquium in 1968, “the
crucial point in the Copenhagen interpretation” is cap-
tured, “but not very luckily expressed, in Bohr’s famous
statement that all experiments are to be described in
classical terms” (Weizsa¨cker 1971, p. 25). As a devotee
of Bohr, this was a view that Weizsa¨cker endorsed whole-
heartedly, but which he now wished to justify. “My pro-
posed answer is that Bohr was essentially right” in argu-
ing that the instrument must be classically describable,
“but that he did not know why” (Weizsa¨cker 1971, p. 28).
The paradox at the heart of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion for Weizsa¨cker is therefore to be stated: “Having
thus accepted the falsity of classical physics, taken liter-
ally, we must ask how it can be explained as an essen-
tially good approximation” when describing objects at
the macrolevel. He spells this out:
This amounts to asking what physical con-
dition must be imposed on a quantum-
theoretical system in order that it should show
the features which we describe as “classical.”
My hypothesis is that this is precisely the con-
dition that it should be suitable as a mea-
suring instrument. If we ask what that pre-
supposes, a minimum condition seems to be
that irreversible processes should take place
in the system. For every measurement must
produce a trace of what has happened; an
event that goes completely unregistered is not
a measurement. Irreversibility implies a de-
scription of the system in which some of the
information that we may think of as being
present in the system is not actually used.
Hence the system is certainly not in a “pure
state”; we will describe it as a “mixture.” I
am unable to prove mathematically that the
condition of irreversibility would suffice to de-
fine a classical approximation, but I feel con-
fident it is a necessary condition (Weizsa¨cker
1971, p. 29, emphasis in original).
Weizsa¨cker’s remarks here point to a program of dynam-
ical explanation that had been pursued since the 1950s.
After the Second World War, a number of physicists had
devoted themselves to investigating the thermodynamic
conditions of irreversibility that would need to hold in
order for a measurement to be registered macroscopi-
cally as “classical.” Bohr himself had hinted at the idea
that “the essential irreversibility inherent in the very con-
cept of observation” might provide the clue to explain
the “classicality” of quantum systems at the macroscopic
level as a thermodynamic irreversible process on a num-
ber of occasions (Bohr 1958b, p. 310). “The amplifi-
cation of atomic effects,” as he noted, “emphasizes the
irreversibility characteristic of the very concept of obser-
vation” (Bohr 1958a, p. 170). Yet, as Everett pointed
out in 1956, “there is nowhere to be found any consistent
explanation of this ‘irreversibility’ attributed to the mea-
suring process” (Everett’s notes on Stern’s letters 1956,
as quoted in Osnaghi et al. 2009, p. 106).
A more rigorous “thermodynamic approach” was de-
veloped independently by Gu¨nther Ludwig in the sec-
ond half of the 1950s (Jammer 1974, p. 488). Lud-
wig attempted to explain measurement by means of a
thermodynamic analysis of the irreversible amplification
process triggered by a microscopic event (Jammer 1974,
p. 490). As Osnaghi, Freitas, and Freire explain, many
physicists saw Ludwig’s approach as opening up “the
possibility of providing a rigorous foundation for Bohr’s
approach, thereby dispelling the misunderstandings sur-
rounding the alleged subjectivism of the Copenhagen
view” (Osnaghi et al. 2009, p. 103). A number of at-
tempts to develop further Ludwig’s basic program of a
thermodynamic approach were pursued during the 1960s,
the most elaborate of which was the work carried out
by the Italian physicists Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi
(Daneri et al. 1962). Their aim was to find the exact
ergodicity conditions for the validity of the ergodic theo-
rem in quantum statistical mechanics. As Jeffery Bub
explained, the question the authors wished to answer
was, “How does the theory guarantee that quantum theo-
retical macrostates will not exhibit interference effects?”
(Bub 1971, p. 66). The answer Daneri, Loinger, and
Prosperi gave was that the physical structure of a large
body implies ergodicity conditions, which in turn pre-
vent the system from exhibiting quantum superpositions
at the macroscopic scale (see also Ludwig 1953, 1955).
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In Rosenfeld’s view, this work represented a ma-
jor step forward in clearing up the misunderstandings
and the “extravagant speculations” on the measure-
ment problem, which had arisen through “the deficien-
cies in von Neumann’s axiomatic treatment” (Rosenfeld
1979, p. 537). Importantly, Rosenfeld declared that the
Daneri–Loinger–Prosperi approach was “in complete har-
mony with Bohr’s ideas” (Rosenfeld 1979, p. 539). Jef-
fery Bub, on the other hand, saw it as “basically opposed
to Bohr’s ideas” insofar as it treated classical mechanics
as an “approximation to a quantum theory of macro-
scopic systems (Bub 1968; see also Bub 1971, p. 65). In
a similar vein, Max Jammer called into question whether
the approach of Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi was “re-
ally congenial, or at least not incompatible, with the basic
tenets of the Copenhagen interpretation” (Jammer 1974,
p. 493). Yet as we have seen, the epistemological primacy
of classical physics, on which the functional description
of experiment rested, was for Bohr perfectly compatible
with, and indeed depended on, the view that classical
mechanics was an approximation of quantum mechanics.
Those physicists closest to Bohr appreciated this point.
As Weizsa¨cker put it, Bohr’s emphasis on “the classi-
cal description of an instrument just meant that only so
far as it was an approximation would the instrument be
of use as an instrument” (Weizsa¨cker, 1987, p. 283).
There was never any suggestion for Bohr that measuring
instruments could not in principle be described by quan-
tum mechanics, or that classical dynamics was somehow
more fundamental in an ontological sense than quantum
mechanics.
Yet the subtleties of Bohr’s point of view were typi-
cally lost on other physicists, many of whom saw little
value in Bohr’s forays into epistemology. This episode
is indicative of the state of confusion surrounding Bohr’s
doctrine of classical concepts, which persisted well into
the 1960s and early 1970s. In a qualified sense, Rosen-
feld was right—there was no essential conflict between
Bohr’s epistemological view of the doctrine of classical
concepts and the attempt to find a dynamical solution to
the problem of the quantum-to-classical transition.
Nevertheless, an adequate dynamical solution turned
out to be far more complicated than Bohr or many of his
followers had originally thought. Rosenfeld’s endorse-
ment of the ergodic solution as having provided the solu-
tion to the problem was based on his view that “the re-
duction rule” is “essentially a thermodynamic effect, and,
accordingly, only valid to the thermodynamic approxima-
tion” (Rosenfeld to Belinfante, 24 July 1972, Rosenfeld
Papers, quoted in Osnaghi et al. 2009, footnote 243).
In hindsight, such pronouncements appear to have been
overly optimistic. Eugene Wigner, who retained a key
interest in foundational questions of quantum mechanics
throughout the 1970s, rightly pointed out that the ergod-
icity conditions of Daneri–Loinger–Prosperi, which pur-
ported to explain “the transition to a classical description
of the apparatus,” rested on “an arbitrary step,” which
only served to “postulate the miracle which disturbs us”
(Wigner 1995, p. 65). In a similar vein, Bub argued that
the authors had simply reintroduced “von Neumann’s
infinite regress all over again” (Bub 1971, p. 70). The
problem of the quantum-to-classical transition remained
unsolved. On this point, Wigner and Bub were right.
C. The Relation between Object, Instrument, and
the External World
Looking back over the history of the foundations of
quantum mechanics, it is easy to see that the crucial ob-
stacle to an understanding of the quantum-to-classical
transition was the erroneous assumption that we can
treat quantum systems as isolated from the environment.
There do, however, appear to be anticipations of the rel-
evance of the environment in the 1950s and 1960s. In his
contribution to the Bohr Festschrift edited by Pauli in
1955, Heisenberg reminded his readers that a quantum-
mechanical treatment of the “interaction of the system
with the measuring apparatus” does not of itself “as a
rule lead to a definite result (e.g., the blackening of a
photographic plate)” (Heisenberg 1955, p. 22). Inclu-
sion of further systems, such as a secondary apparatus or
a human observer, will not terminate the resulting von
Neumann chain (von Neumann 1955) if these systems are
treated as interacting quantum systems.
Heisenberg observed that this situation had prompted
a number of physicists to attempt to develop a modified
dynamics of wave-packet collapse, or to suggest that the
conscious observer plays an essential role in the process
of measurement. Yet, as Heisenberg explained, such at-
tempts failed to grasp the real nature of the problem. In
the von Neumann scheme, “the apparatus and the sys-
tem are regarded as cut off from the rest of the world
and treated as a whole according to quantum mechan-
ics” (Heisenberg 1955, p. 22, emphasis added). Yet the
measuring apparatus is in reality never isolated from its
environment: “If the measuring device would be isolated
from the rest of the world, it would be neither a mea-
suring device nor could it be described in the terms of
classical physics at all” (Heisenberg 1989, p. 24). Heisen-
berg emphasized that “the connection with the external
world is one of the necessary conditions for the measur-
ing apparatus to perform its function” (Heisenberg 1955,
pp. 26–7). Heisenberg spelled out this position in more
detail in Physics and Philosophy. Here it is worth quot-
ing Heisenberg at some length:
Again the obvious starting point for the phys-
ical interpretation of the formalism seems
to be the fact that mathematical scheme of
quantum mechanics approaches that of clas-
sical mechanics in dimensions which are large
compared to the size of atoms. But even this
statement must be made with some reserva-
tions. Even in large dimensions there are
many solutions of the quantum-mechanical
equations to which no analogous solutions can
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be found in classical physics. In these solu-
tions the phenomenon of the “interference of
probabilities” would show up . . . [which] does
not exist in classical physics. Therefore, even
in the limit of large dimensions the correla-
tion between the mathematical symbols, the
measurements, and the ordinary concepts is
by no means trivial. In order to get at such an
unambiguous correlation one must take an-
other feature of the problem into account. It
must be observed that the system which is
treated by the methods of quantum mechan-
ics is in fact a part of a much bigger system
(eventually the whole world); it is interacting
with this bigger system; and one must add
that the microscopic properties of the bigger
system are (at least to a large extent) un-
known. This statement is undoubtedly a cor-
rect description of the actual situation . . . .
The interaction with the bigger system with
its undefined microscopic properties then in-
troduces a new statistical element into the
description . . . of the system under consid-
eration. In the limiting case of the large di-
mensions this statistical element destroys the
effects of the “interference of probabilities” in
such a manner that the quantum-mechanical
scheme really approaches the classical one in
the limit (Heisenberg 1989, pp. 121–2).
In this intriguing passage, Heisenberg seems to have rec-
ognized that one cannot simply appeal to the macro-
scopic dimensions or the mass of the measuring appa-
ratus to explain why the apparatus is never found in a
quantum superposition. Such a view marks a departure
from Bohr’s suggestion that the heaviness of the appa-
ratus that renders it effectively classical. Heisenberg en-
larges the system–apparatus composite to include cou-
plings to further degrees of freedom in the environment
(the “external world”). This is a most interesting point.
Of course, for practical purposes, Heisenberg admits that
we often treat the quantum system and the measuring
apparatus as isolated from the rest of the world. But, in
Heisenberg’s view, a proper account of the quantum-to-
classical transition must in the end rest on “the under-
lying assumption,” which Heisenberg took to be implicit
in the Copenhagen interpretation, “that the interference
terms are in the actual experiment removed by the partly
undefined interactions of the measuring apparatus, with
the system and with the rest of the world (in the formal-
ism, the interaction produces a ‘mixture’)” (Heisenberg
1955, p. 23).
D. Decoherence Theory and “Emergent
Classicality”
Heisenberg’s remarks might be read, somewhat chari-
tably, as anticipating certain results of the decoherence
program. After all, it is the hallmark of decoherence that
it proceeds from the recognition that it is practically im-
possible to isolate the quantum system and the apparatus
from the surrounding environment, and moreover that it
is precisely this feature that results in the emergence of
classicality. But while Heisenberg emphasizes the im-
portance of environmental interactions, he gives no de-
tailed account of precisely how “the interference terms
are . . . removed by the partly undefined interactions of
the measuring apparatus, with the system and with the
rest of the world” (Heisenberg 1955, p. 23). In particular,
nowhere does he explicate the specific role of entangle-
ment between the system and the environment as the
crucial point in the dynamical emergence of classicality
in the system.
While physicists such as Bohr, Heisenberg, and
Schro¨dinger had recognized the nonseparability of quan-
tum systems—i.e., entanglement—as a characteristic fea-
ture of quantum mechanics as early as the 1920s and
1930s,6 the feeling prevailed that entanglement was some-
thing unusual and a peculiarly microscopic phenomenon
that would have to be carefully created in the laboratory
(such as in an EPR-type experiment). Entanglement was
regarded as an essential quantum feature that would nec-
essarily have to be irreconcilable with classicality. These
long-held beliefs likely contributed to the comparably late
“discovery” of the theory of decoherence, which has its
roots in Zeh’s work from the 1970s but did not receive
broader attention until Zurek’s contributions appeared in
the 1980s (Camilleri 2009b).
It is indeed a particular irony that entanglement would
turn out to be not something that had to be tamed to
ensure classicality but would instead assume an impor-
tant role in our understanding of aspects of the quantum-
to-classical transition. Decoherence describes how en-
tangling interactions with the environment influence the
statistics of results of future measurements on the sys-
tem. Decoherence provides a quantitative, dynamical
explanation, wholly within standard mechanics, of the
difficulty of creating and observing many superposition
states and interference phenomena (most notably, those
concerning “classical” quantities such as position), es-
pecially for mesoscopic and macroscopic systems whose
many degrees of freedom typically lead to strong coupling
to the environment (Bacciagaluppi 2012, Joos et al. 2003,
Schlosshauer 2004, 2007, Zeh 1970, Zurek 1981, 1982,
2003).
Thus, decoherence provides a partial solution to the
dynamical problem of the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion, insofar as decoherence describes effective restric-
6 Witness, for example, Schro¨dinger, who had coined the term “en-
tanglement” (Verschra¨nkung in German) in 1935 (Schro¨dinger
1935a,b, 1936) and referred to it not as “one but rather the
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces
its entire departure from classical lines of thought” (Schro¨dinger
1935b, p. 555, emphasis in the original).
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tions on the superposition principle for subsystems inter-
acting with other systems. Decoherence addresses what
Bub (2012) has called a consistency problem: the agree-
ment between the probability distributions obtained from
quantum mechanics and classical mechanics in the rele-
vant cases. It is in this narrow qualified sense that we
may say that “classicality,” so to speak, “emerges” out
of the quantum formalism.
A purely dynamical account such as decoherence, how-
ever, must be viewed in the context of the series of simi-
lar attempts made by Bohr’s followers (see Sec. III B).
Its relationship to Bohr’s views regarding the object–
instrument divide and the primacy of classical concepts
should therefore be judged in the same way as those ear-
lier attempts: as something that was believed by many
of Bohr’s followers to be in natural harmony with Bohr’s
views. The dynamical problem of the quantum–classical
transition, as many of Bohr’s followers recognized, in
fact addressed a problem quite different from the chiefly
epistemological problem that had preoccupied Bohr. Of
course, if classical concepts are understood in a purely
pragmatic sense—as something we simply do use when
we perform a measurement—decoherence may supply a
justification for their use. In this particular reading of
classical concepts, decoherence not only tells us why the
concepts of classical physics are applicable in the macro-
scopic situations relevant to our experience despite the
underlying quantum-mechanical description of the world,
but also when and where these concepts can be applied.
On the other hand, insofar as decoherence is simply a
consequence of a realistic application of the standard
quantum formalism, which must itself be given a physical
interpretation, one may suggest that the use of classical
concepts has already been presupposed in any experimen-
tal setup, and that therefore any “derivation” of classical
concepts from the quantum formalism is simply circular.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
“It would be a misconception,” Bohr wrote in 1929,
“to believe that the difficulties of atomic theory may be
evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical
physics by new conceptual forms” (Bohr 1985, p. 294).
Reiterating this point the same year in his “Introduc-
tory Survey,” he insisted that it no longer seemed likely
“that the fundamental concepts of classical theories will
ever become superfluous for the description of physical
experience” (Bohr 1987b, p. 16).
Such remarks have often been interpreted as indicat-
ing some kind of Kantian element in Bohr’s philosophy.
Yet the real problem for Bohr was not so much that we
lack the cognitive faculties or the capacity to develop new
concepts or a new language for describing the quantum
world, but that the very success of quantum mechanics
lies precisely in accounting for a vast array of experimen-
tal evidence, which itself depends on the basic conceptual
framework of classical physics. As we have shown in this
paper, Bohr’s view of the indispensability of classical con-
cepts is primarily epistemological in nature. To put it in
Kroes’s terms, Bohr was convinced that “the structural
description of physical reality rests implicitly on a func-
tional description of at least part of the world” (Kroes
2003, p. 74). Bohr was convinced that any functional de-
scription of an experiment in physics must be a classical
description, and it was in this sense that he maintained
that physics could not do without classical concepts.
Bohr’s epistemological thesis concerning a functional
description of experiment should be distinguished from
the efforts, which gathered momentum in the 1960s, to
supply a dynamical explanation of the emergence of clas-
sicality from quantum theory. What such approaches
have aimed for—and, in the case of decoherence, with
great success—is to ensure, through consideration of the
dynamics, a consistency between the quantum and clas-
sical descriptions (expressed in terms of the relevant
probabilistic predictions) particularly for mesoscopic and
macroscopic systems. While such approaches can pro-
vide, post facto, a physical, pragmatic justification for
the applicability of classical concepts, they do not touch
on Bohr’s main concern of an epistemology of experi-
ment that underlies his doctrine of classical concepts. In-
deed, his doctrine was premised on the assumption that a
quantum-mechanical treatment of the measurement ap-
paratus would be “essentially equivalent with a classical
description.” To this extent, Bohr’s doctrine actually
rests on the presupposition that we can, for all intents
and purposes, treat the measuring apparatus as a classi-
cal system. Indeed, it was Bohr’s conviction that if this
presupposition did not hold, it would be impossible to
acquire knowledge about quantum objects by means of
experiment.
In this sense, one may say that Bohr’s fundamental
point was that any interpretation of quantum mechanics
must in the end fall back on the use of classical concepts,
because such concepts play an indispensible role in exper-
imental contexts in which we acquire empirical knowledge
of the world. Whether Bohr was correct in this assertion
is a matter requiring further philosophical reflection, but
a discussion of this point would take us beyond the scope
of this paper. Our purpose here was not to present a
defense of Bohr’s view, but to offer a reading of Bohr—a
reading that suggests that the possibility of a peaceful
coexistence between Bohr’s philosophy and the insights
brought about by decoherence theory is more viable than
has often been claimed.
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